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Summary
The boom and bust in energy prices experienced recently has its parallels 
in the boom and bust of energy prices in the 1970s and 1980s. The earlier 
boom period saw the Government of Alberta struggle with restraining 
spending and so became heavily dependent on high energy prices. When 
in 1986 energy prices crashed the government suff ered a string of large 
defi cits that was followed by draconian cuts to spending. From 2000 
to 2008 the government enjoyed another boom in energy prices and 
again found it diffi  cult to restrain spending. The recent crash in energy 
prices threatens the government with repeaƟ ng the earlier experience 
of defi cits followed by dramaƟ c spending cuts. As it prepares its 2009 
budget the government has an opportunity to learn from the past and 
to quickly and decisively put its budget on a path toward a much smaller 
reliance on energy-related revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION
OPEC is attempting to reduce output to stabilize oil prices, a recession is coming on fast, housing 
markets are softening, and the Alberta government is suffering a fall in energy royalty income that threatens to 
produce a defi cit for the fi rst time in more than a decade. While these conditions describe the current economic 
situation, they also describe what was happening in the mid-1980s. In this note, we examine the parallels 
between the economic conditions of the 1980s and those of today, and review Alberta’s response to the earlier 
episode. In so doing, our intention is to draw lessons from that earlier period that can be applied to the current 
economic situation.
 Our message is simple: the recent boom and bust in energy prices has its parallels in the boom and bust 
of energy prices in the 1970s and 1980s. The earlier period saw Alberta struggle to restrain spending in an 
environment of booming revenues, allowing a sizeable “budget gap” to open between its spending obligations 
and its non-energy revenues — a gap it fi lled with energy-related revenues. This response, however, exposed 
the province to the risk of defi cit if energy prices fell — as they did in 1986 to levels consistent with long-term 
trends. The government, slow to adjust to this new reality and failing to reduce the size of its budget gap, saw 
a rapid decline into debt and growing debt-servicing obligations, forcing it make draconian cuts to program 
spending until the budget gap fi nally became small enough that energy-related revenues could fi ll it.
 From 2000 to 2008, Alberta again enjoyed an energy price boom, and once again the budget gap grew 
and became exposed to the risk of a correction in energy prices, which has occurred since mid-2008. Now, as it 
prepares its fi rst budget following the bust in energy prices, the Alberta government has an opportunity to learn 
from the past and to put its budget quickly and decisively on a path toward much less reliance on energy-related 
revenues. To do otherwise invites a replay of the fi scal deterioration and draconian budget adjustments that 
followed the crash in energy prices in 1986.
 In the next section, we describe the evolution of the Alberta government’s fi nances through the 1970-
1993 period of energy boom and bust. We then review the actions the government took after 1993 to re-establish 
its fi nances on a sustainable footing. We compare the current economic situation with that in 1987 and draw 
budgeting lessons from the earlier period. We conclude by discussing some options for the future.
THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY:
ALBERTA’S FINANCES FROM 1970 TO 1993
In the eight years prior to the fi rst OPEC oil price shock in 1974, Alberta’s resource revenues averaged 
$290 million per year. The effect of the OPEC price shock, combined with the efforts of the Progressive 
Conservative government of Premier Peter Lougheed to negotiate a new royalty framework, contributed to a 
dramatic increase in resource revenues.1 In the eight years following the fi rst OPEC oil price shock, resource 
revenues averaged $2.5 billion per year.2 This rapid growth in resource revenues and the recognition of the need 
to save revenue generated by the sale of a non-renewable resource led to the creation of the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF) in 1976.3 The fund was established with a special appropriation of $1.5 billion, 
1 Lougheed’s renegotiation of energy royalties in 1972 caused considerable displeasure in the oil and gas industry, which had argued for the sanctity 
of royalty contracts signed in 1949; for a description and discussion, see G. Doern and G. Toner, The Politics of Energy: The Development and 
Implementation of the NEP (Toronto: Methuen, 1985). A similar reaction followed the changes to the royalty regime announced in 2008. 
2 The two revenue estimates in this paragraph are from P. Boothe, The Growth of Government Spending in Alberta (Toronto: Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 1995), table 2.1.
3 Saving non-renewable resource revenue for the benefi t of future generations of Albertans was one of three goals identifi ed for the AHSTF upon its 
establishment. The other goals were to provide benefi ts to the current generation of Albertans and to diversify the provincial economy. It is interesting 
to note that the government of the time was concerned with the effect that rapidly growing resource revenues were having on expectations for still 
further increases in program spending. Based on interviews conducted with policymakers in power at this time, Boothe (The Growth of Government 
Spending in Alberta) reports a consensus among them that diverting resource royalties to the AHSTF would be effective at taming such expectations.
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and the Alberta government committed to add to it 30% of future resource revenues collected.4
 By the end of the 1970s, the second OPEC oil price shock had allowed the province to enjoy high 
levels of resource revenues that enabled it to keep tax rates low and to put in place a strategy for saving a 
signifi cant portion of those revenues. It was perhaps for that reason that, in 1978 the provincial treasurer, noting 
satisfaction with low levels of taxation, high levels of government services, and on-going budget surpluses, 
could afford to raise the possibility of increasing the share of resource revenues committed to the AHSTF.5 
 Alberta’s rosy budgetary picture of the 1970s came to an end with the 1980 National Energy Program 
(NEP)6 and a deep North America-wide recession that began in 1982. The recession slowed the economy and 
the NEP not only slowed the growth in resource revenues but prompted the provincial government to increase 
spending in the form of support to the energy industry.7 The effects of these events on Alberta’s budget surplus 
were mitigated by the decision in 1982 to divert the investment income earned by the AHSTF to general 
revenues and to reduce from 30% to 15% the portion of resource revenues deposited in the AHSTF. These two 
fi scal adjustments — which were envisioned to last only for two fi scal years, but proved to have a longer life — 
plus a renegotiation of some aspects of the NEP caused resource revenues to recover and enabled the provincial 
government to remain in budgetary surplus until 1985.
 Despite the diffi cult times experienced in the early 1980s, expectations for high oil prices for the 
foreseeable future remained. Indeed, the petroleum boom of the 1970s was never seen as a transitory, short-
lived boom that would be followed by an inevitable bust, but as establishing a permanently higher growth 
path for the Alberta economy.8 Signs that this optimism was unfounded soon became apparent. High and 
rapidly increasing world oil prices after 1978 had resulted in reduced demand for oil and, after 1981, prices 
began to moderate. The weakening demand for oil in the early 1980s was due to the recession that struck the 
industrialized oil-consuming nations, energy conservation by consumers, and the substitution by consuming 
countries away from oil to coal and nuclear energy.9 Global oil consumption fell from 56 million barrels of oil 
per day in 1979 to under 45 million barrels of oil per day in 1983.10 From 1982 to 1985, OPEC attempted to 
stem the reduction in world oil prices, but it failed to enforce the production quotas it imposed on its members, 
and by 1985 the world price of oil stood at just under US$25 per barrel. Saudi Arabia through this period was 
the “swing producer,” cutting its production to stem the falling prices that were caused in part by other OPEC 
members’ exceeding their production quotas. By August 1985, Saudi Arabia decided it had had enough of this 
situation, and by early 1986 it had more than doubled its oil production.11 By mid-1986, the world price of oil 
fell to a low of US$10 per barrel, and from 1986 to 1998 hovered around US$15 per barrel. Not surprisingly, 
Alberta’s revenues took a catastrophic hit.
4 By the end of fi scal year 1981/82, the AHSTF had received $8.3 billion of resource revenues and had earned $2.65 billion in investment income. 
Despite $1.3 billion of spending on capital projects, the AHSTF was valued, at cost, at $9.7 billion in 1982. After adjusting for infl ation (using the 
Alberta all-items consumer price index), this amount would have grown to $22.5 billion in 2008. At the end of fi scal year 2007/08, however, the 
AHSTF was valued, at cost, at just $16.4 billion, so its real value had been allowed to fall quite considerably over time. See Alberta, Finance and 
Enterprise, Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Annual Report, 2007-2008 (Edmonton, 2008).
5 M. Leitch, Budget Address (Edmonton, 17 March 1978).
6 As a result of the NEP, through a series of negotiated settlements between Alberta and the federal government, the price of “old oil” (oil discovered 
prior to 1980) was set as a percentage of the world price; the price of “new oil” was allowed to rise to the world price in an agreement signed in 1983.
7 Provincial support for the industry included a $5.4 billion program, introduced in 1982, of royalty reductions and grants designed to increase 
the fl ow of revenue to the industry. In the same year, the federal government supplemented this effort with its own $2 billion assistance plan; see 
Doern and Toner, The Politics of Energy, pp. 114-115. Measured in 2008 dollars, these two support programs were worth $17.2 billion, an amount 
considerably larger than the bailout offered to GM and Chrysler by the federal and Ontario governments in late 2008.
8 As noted by R. Mansell, “Fiscal Restructuring in Alberta: An Overview,” in A Government Reinvented: A Study of Alberta’s Defi cit Elimination 
Program, edited by C.J. Bruce, R.D. Kneebone, and K.J. McKenzie (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997).
9 See F.J. Al-Chalabi, “The World Oil Price Collapse of 1986: Causes and Implications for the Future of OPEC,” in After the Oil Price Collapse: 
OPEC, the United States and the World Oil Market, edited by W.L. Kohl (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
10 E. Krapels, “The Fundamentals of the World Oil Market of the 1980s,” in After the Oil Price Collapse.
11 H. Askari, “Saudi Arabia’s Oil Policy: Its Motivations and Impacts,” in After the Oil Price Collapse.
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 Prior to 1986, the province’s most pressing concern was the depletion of its resource base, but high oil 
prices were expected to solve that problem by fi nally making the exploitation of the vast northern oil sands 
economically feasible. With the collapse of oil prices in 1986 and a corresponding 47% decline (in real terms) 
in the Canadian dollar price of oil, however, Albertans and their provincial government had to deal with a new 
economic reality. A 63% loss in resource revenues and a 30% loss in total revenues devastated the provincial 
budget for fi scal year 1986/87. Premier Don Getty, newly elected in 1986, noted that he had “inherited an 
economy and budget based on $40 oil — and the price of oil was $13.”12 The government’s immediate response 
was to grab more revenue. With the fi scal year 1986/87 budget, the government completely abandoned its efforts 
to save non-renewable resource revenues and now diverted all investment income earned by the now-moribund 
AHSTF into general revenues. 
On the expenditure side, however, the government largely behaved as if it expected the good times 
associated with high oil prices to return at any time. Indeed, Premier Getty remarked that trying to control 
spending after the prolonged period of strong revenue growth was akin to “turning the Queen Mary.”13 As a 
consequence, and despite the grab of additional revenues, the budget plunged into defi cit and would remain 
there for the next nine fi scal years. By the end of fi scal year 1993/94, the provincial government had moved 
from a net asset position of $12.6 billion in 1985 to a net debt position of $8.3 billion — a $21 billion loss in 
wealth.14
 Despite evidence that the world market for oil had adjusted in a way that should warrant caution, 
Alberta’s budgeting choices during the late 1980s and early 1990s refl ected the earlier assumption that prices 
would resume their upward trend, an ill-founded optimism that would have serious consequences. As it turned 
out, world oil prices peaked in real (constant purchasing power) terms in 1983 and would not recover to that 
level until 2005.
 The 1980s proved to be a disastrous decade for provincial budget-makers. The government’s heavy 
dependence on royalty income and its reluctance either to cut those expenditures or to raise tax rates 
immediately following the loss in energy royalties allowed its strong balance sheet to become awash in red ink. 
Steadily increasing servicing costs on the growing debt made the inevitable fi scal adjustment larger and more 
painful the longer the province waited to make that adjustment. The reality that Alberta had been living through 
a transitory boom took a remarkably long time to sink in, and it was only after eight years that the inevitable 
adjustments were made to put the province’s fi nances back on the road to fi scal rectitude.151
GETTING BACK ON TRACK
Concern over the long string of defi cits that followed the collapse of oil prices in 1986 provided the 
focus of the provincial election campaign in summer 1993, which was fought over how to respond to the 
extraordinarily rapid accumulation of debt that had occurred over the previous nine years. All three major 
political parties supported taking strong steps to eliminate the defi cit, and both the Liberal and Progressive 
Conservative parties advocated deep cuts to government spending in order to achieve it. The Progressive 
Conservatives, under new leader Ralph Klein, were elected to a majority government in June 1993 on a platform 
of a 20% cut to spending.
 The new premier proclaimed that Alberta had a spending problem, not a revenue problem, so that 
the elimination of the defi cit would come from cuts to spending, not from increases in tax rates. Since the 
12 Quoted in Boothe, The Growth of Government Spending in Alberta, p. 94.
13 Ibid., p. 92.
14 Alberta, Budget 2001, The Future: Meeting Priorities, Sharing Benefi ts (Edmonton, April 24, 2001).
15 A painfully slow response to a new fi scal reality is not unique to Alberta. For a detailed examination of how Canadian provincial and federal 
governments failed in the 1980s to respond to economic conditions that caused a rapid accumulation of debt, see R. Kneebone and J. Chung, “Where 
Did the Debt Come From?” in Is the Debt War Over?, edited by C. Ragan and W. Watson (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2004). 
The authors argue that the slow response was the reason for the need to introduce large cuts to federal and provincial spending programs in the 1990s.
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defi cit was then equal to 20% of expenditures, a dramatic cut in program spending was required. The new 
government’s fi rst budget called for a deep and speedily implemented 20% cut in spending, to be completed 
by the end of fi scal year 1995/96 and, in fact, the government kept its promise to eliminate the defi cit through 
cuts in program expenditures. Relative to values at the end of 1992/93, real per capita program expenditures 
fell by 31% by the end of 1996/97, eliminating the defi cit.16 The price of adjustment, however, was high: cuts to 
spending on public health care, for example, were accompanied by the closure of hospitals.
While cuts to program spending were the most public of the new government’s efforts to regain control 
of its fi nances, they were not the only measures taken. The process of budgeting in Alberta would also change 
in the 1990s. Important in that period were the easily identifi ed and understood target of a zero defi cit, an 
unwavering dedication to meeting that target by both the premier and the treasurer, and the speed with which it 
was accomplished.17 Most important of all, however, were legislative changes that allowed the government to 
build credibility by systematically meeting pre-announced defi cit targets on the way to the goal of a zero defi cit, 
and to manage a long-standing budgeting problem: the volatility of its revenues. 
 The strategy of announcing long-term fi scal targets as a way of imposing discipline on annual budgeting 
exercises proved highly successful. With the elimination of the defi cit in 1995, the government introduced a new 
long-term fi scal target: debt elimination. In exactly the same way as Premier Lougheed’s government had tried 
to restrain expectations for new spending by formally committing to a savings target, the Klein government 
used long-term fi scal commitments to bind annual budgeting efforts and force them to constrain spending even 
in the face of rapidly growing resource royalties. The target of debt elimination was met during fi scal year 
1999/2000. A new long-term fi scal target has not yet been announced, although a government-appointed panel, 
the Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission, recently recommended building a savings 
fund to $100 billion by 2030.18
 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
The precipitous fall in oil prices since the summer of 2008 closely resembles the context of the great oil 
price collapse of the 1980s (see Figure 1). In the earlier period, prices increased quickly over the six-year period 
1979-1985 before falling by 47% in 1986. In the most recent period, prices increased quickly for eight years 
(2000-2008) before falling even more steeply — by 70% from July to December 2008. In the earlier period, 
Alberta suffered the loss of 63% of its non-renewable resource revenues; in its November 2008 fi scal update, 
the government reports that, in fi scal year 2008/09, it expects to receive $4.3 billion, or 23%, less in resource 
revenues than it anticipated it would receive just three months earlier. The bleeding is not expected to stop in 
fi scal year 2009/10.19
16 In fact, the defi cit was eliminated by the end of fi scal year 1995/96, although the program of spending cuts continued nonetheless. For data on the 
size of the spending cuts by ministry and year, see C.J. Bruce, R.D. Kneebone, and K.J. McKenzie, “Introduction,” in A Government Reinvented.
17 R.D. Kneebone and K.J. McKenzie (“The Process Behind Institutional Reform,” in A Government Reinvented) report the results of interviews 
conducted with Premier Klein, six cabinet ministers, seven MLAs, thirteen senior civil servants, and twenty-one representatives of school boards, 
colleges, universities, health authorities, and social service agencies. Interviewees were consistent in identifying the commitment to the zero-defi cit 
target and the unswerving commitment to spending cuts as instrumental in minimizing opposition and easing their implementation.
18 Alberta, Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission (Edmonton, December 2007).
19 In fact, the value for the price of oil shown in Figure 1 for 2008 is the average for the whole year, and hides the price peak of an average of $138 
in July and the fall to $41 in December; see MJ Ervin Associates, online at http://www.mjervin.com/subscriptions/crdweekly09.htm. Moreover, the 
fi gure uses the average of the observations of the oil price for the fi rst seven weeks of 2009 ($43.78) to represent what might be observed during the 
whole of the year, which, if it holds, would hover just above the price that prevailed in the disastrous 1980s.
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FIGURE 1 : Price of Crude Oil, Edmonton Par, 1970 to 2009
Sources: Current dollar prices are from Natural Resources Canada, available online at http://www2.nrcan.ca (1970-2002); and from 
M.J. Ervin and Associates, available online at http://www.mjervin.com/ other_resources.htm (2003-2009). To convert to 
real 2008 dollars, we used the GDP implicit price defl ator for Canada, from Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, series 
v1997756.
Following the crash in energy prices in 1986, the Alberta government appear to have based its budgetary 
policies on the expectation that oil prices would return to higher levels following a “hockey stick” pattern — 
staying level for a short while but increasing steadily thereafter. This assumption proved correct, but the blade 
of the hockey stick proved to be much longer than anticipated, and it took 20 years for real oil prices to return to 
their levels of 1985. By the time oil prices started to climb, the province’s fi nances were in shambles. 
 Now, the real price of oil is back to its post-1972 average level.20 If the current price level refl ects, more 
or less, the long-term level, then movement above that level — such as occurred from 1979 to 1985 and again 
from 1999 to mid-2008 — should be considered a short-term deviation.21 Premier Getty’s famous quote about 
inheriting an economy and budget based on $40 oil when the price turned out to be $13 highlights how the 
Alberta budget and economy treated the extremely high prices of the late 1970s and early 1980s as a permanent 
condition. But the quote also misrepresents the nature of Alberta’s diffi culty after 1986: it did not have a revenue 
problem, but a spending problem. In constant-purchasing-power terms, a barrel of oil after 1986 was worth 
more than at any time between the end of World War II and 1973, and as much as a barrel of oil from 1974 to 
1978. So, from a long-run perspective, the oil prices observed during the mid-1970s were, in effect, permanent. 
What proved to be transitory were the high prices observed from 1979 to 1985. Thus, the source of the 
20 As reported in “Plumbing the Depths,” The Economist, 4 December 2008.
21 Our focus on the price of oil refl ects two considerations. First, the price of oil will determine the viability of plans to develop Alberta’s non-
conventional oil resources, and the development of these resources, particularly the oil sands, will determine Alberta’s economic future and will be 
the major source of government energy revenues. Second, natural gas prices traditionally have tracked changes in oil prices quite closely.
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Alberta government’s fi scal problems was its belief that the level attained after a rapid escalation in price was 
sustainable. 
 Figure 2 illustrates how the provincial budget responded to the 1987 crash in energy prices. The boom 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s enabled the government to afford a large “budget gap” equal to nearly $13 
billion (measured in real 2008 dollars). We defi ne this gap as the difference between the amount the government 
spent on programs and the amount it collected in revenue from all sources except revenue gained from energy 
royalties and investment income spun off by the government’s savings funds.22 The gap of $11.8 billion in fi scal 
year 1984/85, for example, indicates the government was spending $11.8 billion more than it collected by way 
of non-energy-related revenues and investment income. Clearly, such a gap results in a budget defi cit unless 
something fi lls it, which, in 1984/85, was the $14.3 billion of energy-related revenues that the government 
enjoyed; indeed, when measured in 2008 dollars, Alberta had a $2.5 billion surplus that year.
FIGURE 2 : Retrenchment and Expansion
Sources: Alberta, Budget, various years; and authors’ calculations. To convert to real 2008 dollars, we used
the all-items CPI for Alberta, from Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, series v41692327.
 Following the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the province responded by cutting the size of its fi scal 
gap, but not by nearly enough to yield a balanced budget. Energy-related revenues were well below what was 
required to fi ll the fi scal gap, and the government fell into defi cit. By 1993, with little having been done to bring 
the fi scal gap in line with the new lower level of energy-related revenues, the province’s net asset position had 
been completely wiped out and it was now the owner of a considerable amount of debt.
22 The Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission refers to what it calls the government’s “fi scal gap”: the difference between 
provincial spending and the taxes paid by Albertans. The Commission’s fi scal gap is fi lled by resource revenues, net investment income, and transfers 
from the federal government to the Alberta government. Our “budget gap” differs from the Commission’s “fi scal gap” only by the amount of federal 
government transfers. It is worth noting that our measure of the “budget gap,” while intended to identify the reliance of the government on energy-
related revenues, is not a precise measure of that reliance, because personal and corporate income taxes also rise and fall with energy prices and many 
provincial expenditure programs are sensitive to the health of the energy sector.
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 The election of the Klein government and the introduction of a no-defi cit fi scal rule forced a realignment 
of spending that more closely matched the revenues the province was collecting from non-energy sources. That 
is, the provincial government dramatically reduced the size of its budget gap so that it fell below the persistently 
low level of energy-related revenues. In this way, it moved into a budget surplus in fi scal year 1994/95 and 
began to retire debt. By 1999, the budget gap had been reduced suffi ciently that energy-related revenues, 
generated with oil prices averaging just $35 per barrel (in real 2008 dollars), were able to fi ll it and even enable 
the government to maintain budget surpluses. It seemed as though the government had established a fi scal 
regime that would be sustainable over the long term. This, however, was not to last.
 Energy prices and energy-related revenues turned around starting in 2000. By July 2008, the price of oil 
in real dollar terms had increased fourfold to $138 per barrel and energy-related revenues had increased from 
$5.3 billion in fi scal year 1998/99 to an estimated $14.3 billion in 2008/09. Perhaps not coincidently, Figure 2 
shows that the size of the budget gap also grew over this period. Indeed, after 1999, there is a disconcertingly 
close relationship between the size and movements in the budget gap and the size and movements in energy-
related revenues. From fi scal year 2003/04 through 2007/08, the government budgeted to spend 64% of the 
resource revenues it expected to collect; thus, as energy revenues increased, so did spending. Government 
estimates show that, by the end of 2008/09, the budget gap will have widened once more to where it was before 
the spending cuts introduced by the Klein government starting in 1994 — the effort to reduce dependence on a 
volatile revenue source will have completely unravelled.
THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Since the early 1970s, Alberta has enjoyed access to huge revenues earned on the sale of non-renewable 
resources. Unfortunately, however, the size of the bounty cannot be known with any degree of certainty, and this 
makes budgeting challenging.
Twice since 1970 — in 1987 and again since the second half of 2008 — Alberta has had to deal with a 
precipitous fall in energy prices and resource revenues. In the earlier period, the government allowed its budget 
to become heavily dependent on energy-related revenues — a notoriously uncertain revenue source. In so doing, 
the province adopted a high-risk budgeting strategy that would demand painful adjustments to government 
spending or tax rates should energy-related revenues suffer a precipitous decline. When that decline came in 
1987, the government made the inevitable adjustment worse by delaying its implementation until 1994. For six 
years, from fi scal years 1987/88 to 1992/93, the province chose not to reduce the size of its budget gap to match 
the new, lower level of energy-related revenues; by that time, draconian cuts to government spending were 
required to re-establish fi scal probity.
While we appreciate that it is easy to have 20-20 hindsight on these matters, we nonetheless fi nd it 
diffi cult to understand how Alberta could have allowed its budget gap to remain so unresponsive for so long to 
the evidence that energy prices would not soon return to pre-1987 levels. The inevitable fi scal adjustment — 
measured in closed hospitals and deteriorating public infrastructure — was considerably more painful than was 
necessary had action been taken earlier.
 Now, the government is preparing to table its fi rst budget since the most recent precipitous fall in energy 
prices. It has the opportunity to learn from the past and avoid the consequences of its earlier mistakes. The 
painful adjustments in the form of draconian spending cuts in the mid-1990s had their origins in two earlier 
budgeting choices. The fi rst was the decision to adopt the high-risk strategy of allowing the budget to become 
heavily dependent on a volatile source of revenue. The second was the failure to act quickly when collapsing 
energy prices exposed the consequences of the fi rst choice. It is unfortunate that, during the latest energy price 
boom, the government repeated the fi rst budgeting mistake. It would be doubly unfortunate if the province 
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were to repeat the second mistake and risk a rapid dissipation of fi nancial assets and, eventually, the need to 
implement spending cuts of the kind it made in the mid-1990s. 
 The province now has an opportunity to take the all-important fi rst step of putting in place a plan to 
quickly reduce its budget gap to a level appropriate to what is likely to be the long-term outlook for resource-
related revenues. The choices it must make are not easy — they involve consideration of both spending 
cuts and tax increases. In considering spending cuts, the government needs to distinguish between spending 
on infrastructure that is conducive to long-term economic growth and spending on less strategic areas. 
Consideration of tax increases need to be similarly strategic; some are less harmful to long-term growth 
than others.23 However diffi cult are these choices, we stress that they will not become easier with time. On 
the contrary, the experience following the 1987 fall in energy prices shows that delaying the adjustment 
could result in the rapid accumulation of debt and debt-servicing costs, requiring a more painful adjustment 
than if the government acts sooner. Notably, our recommendation requires a commitment on the part of the 
Alberta government to save during boom periods of energy price cycles and, therefore, dovetails with a key 
recommendation of the Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission that the government 
commit to a long-term savings target.
 In urging Alberta to put in place a credible plan for reducing its reliance on energy-related revenues, we 
recognize how tempting it is to do little and wait for high energy prices to return. Indeed, our urging is, in part, 
due to worrying signs that the current government is leaning toward that choice. Energy minister Mel Knight 
reportedly believes that continuing demand from countries such as China and India will cause oil prices — and 
thus the provincial economy — to recover faster than they did following the wrenching oil slump of the mid-
1980s.24 Such expectations, of a quick rebound in oil prices, fuelled the province’s fi scal crisis after the fi rst 
precipitous fall in energy prices.
 We also recognize that it is diffi cult to know what the price of energy will be over the long term, and 
we stress that we do not criticize the Alberta government for erring in its energy price forecasts. Rather, we 
criticize it for allowing its budget to become so heavily dependent on volatile energy-related revenues — that is 
a high-risk budgeting strategy; it has been tried before and has failed, with dire consequences. It is a mistake the 
Alberta government must recognize and take steps to avoid as quickly as possible.
 
23 Tax increases could include eliminating health care premiums, effective 1 January 2009, at an estimated cost of $1 billion in provincial revenues.
24 “A Sticky Ending for the Tar Sands,” The Economist, 15 January 2009.
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